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ABSTRACT. Ruck and Slunecko (2008) present a proposal for a method of investigation of the 
dialogical self which is based on the potential of the image as a form of self-expression and a 
privileged means of accessing its structure and relational dynamics. The main objective of the 
pictorial method is the study of the role of the self’s spatial and temporal dimensions and it 
seeks to become an alternative tool to methods of a narrative nature, which put stress on the 
temporal dimension, and which have dominated dialogical self theory at a meta-theoretical and 
theoretical levels and also at a methodological level. This commentary takes the form of a 
reflection on the dichotomy inherent to the general argument of the authors: image versus 
narrative in the dialogical conception of the self. The viability of both narrative and pictorial 
metaphors, in the description of the dialogicality intrinsic to the processes pertaining to identity 
is discussed through the difference between narrative/textual/linguistic spatiality and 
imagery/pictorial/geographic spatiality. 
 




Within the scope of the dialogical self theory, proposals for new conceptual and 
methodological approaches to the investigation of the component aspects of the 
dialogicality inherent to the self are always enthusiastically and eagerly received. The 
challenge is particularly demanding due not only to the nature of the phenomenon itself, 
the self, but also due to the complexity with which dialogical self theory formulates that 
phenomenon. As it happens, Ruck and Slunecko’s article (2008) is very representative 
of this complexity, bringing forward many fundamental questions raised by dialogical 
self theory such as, for example, the role of the relationship between temporality and 
spatiality in the constitution of the processes pertaining to identity or the contribution of 
each of the different modes (narrative and imagery) to the production of meaning. This 
seems to be as much more important as, in fact, some of these appear to be taken as 
acquired and usually remain outside the efforts for conceptualization and reflection. 
 
AUTHORS’ NOTE. Please address correspondence regarding this article to the first author at this email 
address: liliana.meira@gmail.com  
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Ruck & Slunecko's general argument and method 
Ruck and Slunecko (2008) begin by questioning a core issue in the theory of the 
dialogical self: the relationship between spatiality and temporality in determining the 
dialogicality intrinsic to the identity processes. Thus they argue that the temporal 
dimension has been privileged and they focus on the need for the self’s spatial 
dimension to assume a more predominant and intentional role in the conceptualization 
and study of the dialogical self. More than exclusively considering the spatial 
dimension, the authors seek to understand how both dimensions – spatial and temporal 
– relate to each other in the emergence of the self.  
The authors make use of the conceptual and methodological assumptions of 
image science, which focuses on the study of meaning’s spatial dimension, i.e., on the 
meaning of visual representation itself, which is thought to emerge from the 
identification of the relationship between the represented elements. Therefore, they 
concretize their argument by presenting a daring proposal for a method of investigation 
of the dialogical self that focuses on the potential of the image as a form of self-
expression and thus as a privileged means of accessing the structure and relational 
dynamics within the dialogical self. Thus, based on arguments in favor of a pictorial 
approach to the dialogical self, the authors highlight the spatial dimension, giving 
intentionality to the study of the relationships between the components of the image as a 
means of accessing the dialogicality intrinsic to identity processes. With this pictorial 
analysis tool, the authors seek to develop the study of the role of the self’s spatial 
dimension, and its goal is to become an alternative and/or additional tool to methods of 
a narrative nature which have dominated investigation in dialogical self theory. 
Theories and concepts as metaphors 
As is known, the theory of the dialogical self appears in an intellectual context 
emerging from the critique of modern epistemology. In this context, there is incentive to 
elaboration and consolidation of new configurations relating to the problem of 
knowledge and the statute of the real which abandon the demands of an unambiguous 
link between reality and representations.  These new metatheoretical frameworks 
support the integration of fictional processes in the epistemological matrix, in the sense 
that current theories and concepts do not aspire to be identical to the world but are 
recognized as possible versions of the highlighted phenomena. That is to say, it is “as if” 
the psychological domain is like a computer, or a story. Thus, it is nowadays largely 
accepted that psychology makes use of organizing metaphors which articulate theories 
and methods in the approach to psychological phenomena (e.g., Leary, 1990). However, 
we must recognize that when using conceptual theories and tools, the organizing 
metaphors are, to a certain extent, literalized, since the phenomena being studied, are 
identified with the concepts used. Concepts and reality are taken as identical and, in this 
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sense, the tools and methods used promote this literalization of organizing metaphors. 
Therefore, up to a point, this is a natural process, but it is also potentially restricting. 
This commentary does not seek to question the metaphorical nature of 
knowledge however it helps us to reveal the movement made by Ruck and Slunecko to 
establish a pictorial metaphor in the approach to the dialogical self which, as we shall 
see, only co-exists tensionally with the traditional metaphor in the dialogical self theory. 
Narrative metaphor 
Traditionally, narrative has been the organizing metaphor of the self in dialogical 
self theory (e.g., Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992). The assumption of the 
narrative mode of meaning is that human beings assign meaning to their lives by 
organizing their experiences in the form of stories. Just like in a story, episodes are 
located and organized in space and time and integrated in a continuum whose whole - 
the life history – gives the person the ability for projection into the future and the sense 
of acting that we call self (McAdams, 2001). Time assumes a main role in the narrative 
not only as an episode structuring and organizing element, but also as a dynamic 
mechanism for constructing meaning through the integration into the narrative of the 
past, of the present and of the anticipation of the future. Therefore, the narrative 
thinking mode (Bruner, 1986) is more than a process for organizing meaning from 
experiences processed by narrative; the narrative and the act of narration in itself 
become organizing principles for the self, integrating the semiotic dynamics from which 
meaning emerges. In this sense, the narrative generates meaning itself (Sarbin, 1986; 
Hermans, 2002). The narrative metaphor also integrates the assumption that the 
construction of meaning in the context of the discursive relationship between the author 
and potential “addressees”, real or imaginary, establishing itself by its nature, as a 
dialogical process. As Hermans and Kempen (1993) mention, when introducing the 
notion of dialogical self, the act of narration always implies an audience, that is to say, a 
dialog with another person, and it is from this dialogical relationship that new meaning 
may emerge.  
Hermans and Kempen (1993), based on Bakhtin’s polyphonic romance 
metaphor (1984), add multivocality to the narrative and dialogical concept of the self, 
i.e., the self ceases to be understood as emerging from the stories told by a single 
narrator; instead, each story of each experience has its own author. These different 
authors, or “I-positions”, may establish dialogue relationships with other relatively 
independent “I-positions”. It is thus that Hermans (2006) introduces the concept of the 
dialogical self as a “theatre of voices”, where the “voice” is sustained, once again, by 
the two main dimensions of the self: space (i.e., the positioning assumed by each author 
in the relationship with another I-position) and time (i.e., the narrative content emerging 
from the dialogue between I-positions). Thus, the dialogical self is a multifaceted 
phenomenon, multivocal and dynamic, emerging from the dialogue relationships 
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between different I-positions (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, 2003). By 
analogy with James’s distinction (1890) between “I” and “Me”, where the “I” 
corresponds to the self’s reflexive property (i.e., the self as knower, author) and the 
“Me” corresponds to the different characteristics that the “I” assigns to itself as his/hers 
(i.e., the self as known, actor), the “I” can assume different I-positions of the self and 
move in the imaginary landscape of the self, expressing itself through the voice issued 
from the position assumed at that moment, the “Me” (in Hermans & Kempen, 1993). 
Each I-position integrates semiotic content which might generate different relational 
dynamics between I-positions from the moment they are vocalized and addressed to 
other I-positions and this sharing of meaning favors the emergence of new repositioning 
and meaning processes (e.g., Valsiner, 2004a).  
With the decentralization of the “I” as single narrator, the narrative matrix is 
maintained as a means of meaning emerging from the dialogue relationships that are 
capable of being established between different and multiple I-positions in the dialogical 
self. This spatialization of the characters in the narrative of the self – I-positions – also 
allows us to conceive internal dialogues in the likeness of interpersonal dialogues. In 
this sense, like in social speeches, the meaning of reality emerges from the narratives 
shared between multiple I-positions in dialogue. The outcome of these relationships is 
always relative depending on their addressee. Therefore, the self is not a predetermined 
phenomenon but, rather, it emerges from the casual dialogical relationships which 
become established between different I-positions (Holquist, 1990). With these 
developments in dialogical self theory, time spatialization also takes place (Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993). Space assumes, with this cumulative transition of the narrative-self to 
the dialogical-self, a main role as defining property of each I-position and of the 
dialogical field itself. This property makes it possible to re-conceptualize the temporal 
dimension itself through the phenomenon of juxtaposition, as mentioned by Ruck and 
Slunecko (this issue). The juxtaposition refers to the ability the self has to contemplate 
at one moment in time two or more positions, voices which narrate two or more parts, 
sometimes even contrasting, of the same story, by assigning it a “pictorial property”. 
This simultaneity of events phenomenon imposes discontinuity in the linearity and 
continuity inherent to the temporal dimension of traditional narration, making it 
possible for dialogical relationships between juxtaposed voices to be analyzed 
independently of the progression of the global narrative. Therefore, this juxtaposition 
phenomenon allows the spatialization of time itself, assigning it reversibility, a 
simultaneous access to the past, the present and the projected future as main elements in 
the construction of meaning (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1993).  
Pictorial  metaphor 
In spite of this movement for time spatialization, Ruck and Slunecko (2008) 
remark that the narrative metaphor tends to emphasize temporality to the detriment of 
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spatiality while dimensions of the dialogicality of the self. It is important to recognize 
that this has also been remarked upon within the scope of literary theory (e.g., Zoran, 
1984). 
Thus, authors use the image and appeal to the assumptions of image science as 
an alternative tool to the narrative methods of studying the dialogical self as a way of 
demonstrating their argument in favor of the need to highlight the spatial dimension of 
the identity processes. They end by electing the image as an expression of these 
processes. With this, authors tell us that “it is as if” the self was an image, bringing to 
the dialogical self theory an imagery / pictorial metaphor. They literalize this metaphor 
when they make use of the analysis of the spatial relationship between the components 
of the image as a means of discovery (revelation) of the identity processes. Thus, the 
elements that compose the self become components of the image and the relationships 
between those elements, spatial relationships.  
With this, Ruck and Slunecko promote an interesting dialogue between the two 
metaphors or ways of thinking about the dialogical self, as well as an important re-
questioning of the intellectual tradition of dialogical self theory. However, could these 
two metaphors be reconcilable? Are both metaphors viable in the approach to the 
identity processes from a psychological perspective? This question arises because both 
metaphors carry with them traces of epistemologies (and ontologies) which sustain 
them and which are inherent to the methods used in both metaphors. In this respect, 
note how, for example, Ruck and Slunecko focus on the relative position of the various 
elements / components of the image and how Hermans (e.g. Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, 1995) focuses on discursive units of meaning, the valuations. The main goal of 
Ruck and Slunecko’s text appears not to be the establishment of a new rational for 
approaching the dialogical self in a complete and substantial sense. Therefore, they do 
not go beyond the description of some of the central assumptions of the analysis and 
composition of images within the scope of image science. That is, they do not mention 
in what way these assumptions and the properties inherent to the image might reflect 
properties capable of being used as conceptual matrix of the self. 
It should be noted that, in this sense, the discussion cannot be maintained 
exclusively at the level of the image and the narrative as means and modes of 
communication and representation. The stance of emphasizing the image or the 
narrative carries with it a commitment to a certain view of the nature of human 
experience and of the meaning production processes. Focusing on this or that 
representation mode demands compromises, both at ontological and at epistemological 
level. As we referred in what concerns the narrative metaphor, the statement is that 
human experience is narratively organized and structured. So, what would be our 
position regarding these questions from a pictorial metaphor?  
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The problem of the image: from perception to fiction 
We represent the world and by doing that, we impregnate it with verbal and 
pictorial images. Therefore, representation encompasses a metaphorization process; it 
approaches the world “as if” the world corresponded to what we say or to the pictorial 
images that we produce about it. In this sense, human experience belongs inexorably to 
the “as if” domain. “The structure of our relationship with things is always figurative; it 
is always a product from work which creates meaning and from imagination” (Marcos, 
2001, p. 21). It is through an “instituting imagination” (Castoriadis cit in Mendes, 2001) 
that the world becomes present. However, the world becomes present and presents itself 
in different ways according to the way we are involved with it. The way we are 
involved with the world also restricts our nearness and appropriation of the world. Now, 
it seems to be precisely at this point that Ruck and Slunecko (2008) fail to recognize in 
a substantial way the differences between image as perception and image as fiction. 
Both refer us to the different world reference and representation modes (see Ricoeur, 
1979). 
Image as perception makes us closer to the world, to the real and, with that, the 
image appears as a portrait or copy, as a representation, which is mediated by our 
perception of the world and of the properties of the objects to which it refers. A fictional 
image may or not refer to the real, but its reference is linguistically mediated and the 
language is not in the world. In this sense, language begins by holding us off the world 
so as to institute it afterwards, when it acts on it in the reference process. Just as Ricoeur 
(1979) writes: 
The ultimate role of the image is not only to diffuse meaning across diverse 
sensorial fields, to hallucinate thought in some way, but on the contrary to effect 
a sort of epoche of the real, to suspend our attention to the real, to place us in a 
state of non-engagement with regard to perception or action, in short, to suspend 
meaning in the neutralized atmosphere to which one could give the name of the 
dimension of fiction. In this state of non-engagement we try new ideas, new 
values, new ways of being-in-the-world. Imagination is this free play of 
possibilities. In this state, fiction can, as we said above, create a redescription of 
reality. (p. 134) 
Thus, from the psychological perspective, involvement with the fictional has this 
function of abstracting models of the world, stimulating actions, thoughts and feelings, 
through which we involve ourselves in social interaction and construct meaning (refer 
to Mar & Oatley, 2008, for a review). 
The problem of space: pictorial space and narrative space 
Taking the image from the perspective of perception, Ruck and Slunecko (2008) 
approach the spatiality of the dialogical self from a pictorial point of view and, with 
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this, they raise another problem. From a pictorial perspective, spatial order is composed 
by lines, vectors and objects represented which consigns it to a planimetric analysis. 
However, Ruck and Slunecko (this issue) appear to have an implicit euclidean vision of 
space since they have based their interpretation of Frida Khalo’s image on the 
identification of points in space and in the expression of its relationships in terms of 
distance, angles, vectors and relative positions. In the same way, the authors consign the 
spatial dimension to a graphic existence that is incompatible with a text’s spatial 
dimension (Zoran, 1984). As we noted, language implies a degree of arbitrariness in the 
relationship between meaning and meaningful, which limits the correspondence 
between the spatiality of meaning and the spatiality of meaningful. Therefore, from a 
narrative perspective, the spatial dimension refers us to the meaning structure of a text 
(Zoran, 1984). Here the limits of the pictorial metaphor can be observed. From a 
psychological perspective, it is precisely the structuring and restructuring of the 
meaning matrix along time which seems to be crucial since it is in that process, 
involved in the dialogical matrix of interpersonal relationships, that meanings are 
negotiated, constructed and reconstructed. 
Conclusion 
 Ruck and Slunecko (2008) raise a crucial issue for a dialogical description of 
human subjectivity: the role spaciality and temporality in the determining identitarian 
processes. However their method of approaching this question close from the 
perspective of science image, seems to limit their initial intuition for psychological 
purposes. Nevertheless, a perspective on image integrated with narrative metaphor 
seems promising. In fact, pictorial metaphor brings a renewed questioning of 
metatheoretical and theoretical tradition of dialogical self theory. Simultaneously, 
pictorial method has the potential to access alternative modes of elocution of I-positions 
trough pictorial mode of expression and this motivates further development both as a 
method of analysis and in its implications for dialogical self theory. Recurring to an 
expression typically used in painting: “the painting isn't solved yet”. 
 
Acknowledgment. This commentary was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science 
and Technology (FCT), by the PhD Grant SFRH / BD / 19452 / 2004 and by the grant 
PTDC/PSI/72846/2006 (Narrative Processes in Psychotherapy). 
 
References 
Bakhtin, M. (1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Brunner, J. (2004). The narrative creation of self. In L. E. Angus & J. McLeod (Eds.), 
The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy: Practice, theory, and research 
(pp. 3-14) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
MEIRA & FERREIRA 
298 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2001). The dialogical self: Toward a theory of personal and cultural 
positioning. Culture & Psychology, 7(3), 243-281 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2002). The dialogical self as a society of mind. Theory & 
Psychology, 12(2), 147-160. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2003). The construction and reconstruction of a dialogical self. 
Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 16, 89-130. 
Hermans, H. J. M., Kempen, H. J. G., & van Loon, J. P. (1992). The dialogical self: 
Beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47, 1, 23-33. 
Hermans, H. J. M., & Kempen, H. J. G. (1993). The dialogical self: Meaning as 
movement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press 
Hermans, H. J. M., & Hermans-Jansen, E. (1995). Self-narratives: The construction of 
meaning in psychotherapy. New York: Guilford Press.  
Holquist, M., (1990). Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world. New York: Routledge. 
Leary, D. E. (1990). Metaphors in the history of psychology. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
McAdams, D. (2001). The psychology of life stories. Review of General Psychology, 
5(2), 100-102. 
Mar, R., & Oatley, K. (2008). The function of fiction is the abstraction and simulation of 
social experience. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(3), 173-192. 
Marcos, M. (2001). Sujeito e comunicação: Perspectiva tensional da alteridade. Porto, 
Portugal: Campo das Letras. 
Mendes, J. (2001). Para quê tantas histórias: O lugar do ficcional na aventura humana. 
Coimbra, Portugal: Minerva Coimbra. 
Ricoeur, P. (1979). The function of fiction in shaping reality. Man and World (now 
Continental Philosophy Review), 12(2), 123-141. 
Ruck, N., & Slunecko, T. (2008). A portrait of a dialogical self: Image science and the 
dialogical self. International Journal for Dialogical Science, 3(1), 261-290. 
Sarbin, T. R. (1986). The narrative and the root metaphor for psychology. In T. R. 
Sarbin (Ed.), Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct (pp. 3-
21). New York: Praeger. 
CULTURE AND DIALOGICAL SELF 
299 
Valsiner, J. (2004, July). The promoter sign: Developmental transformation within the 
structure of dialogical self. Paper presented in the symposium Developmental 
aspects of the dialogical self, 2nd International Conference on the Dialogical 
Self, Ghent, Belgium. 
Zoran, G. (1984). Towards a theory of space in narrative. Poetics Today, 5(2), 309-335. 
 
 






(This page left intentionally blank) 
 
